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Abstract  
This article appraised the corporate veil concept as given judicial imprimatur in the pivotal case of Salomon v A. 
Salomon & Co Ltd and its relevance to co-operative societies in Nigeria by analysing relevant case law and 
statutes.  The article posited that the rigid concept was alive and well in relation to co-operative societies in 
Nigeria and suggested that the uncertainty faced by most common law countries, regarding when the veil could 
be lifted by the court to ameliorate the rigours of the concept could be overcomed if the persuasive dictum of the 
House of Lords in the recent case of Prest v Pretrodel Resources is followed by the Nigerian courts.  The courts 
are however admonished not to exercise this power capriciously. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 A co-operative society is defined as an antonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet 
their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically 
controlled enterprise.1  A co-operative society like any other form of business association in Nigeria is required 
to have a legal framework for its operation.  Co-operative matters are on the concurrent legislative list,2 which 
implies that both levels of government can legislate on co-operatives in Nigeria.3  The federal law on co-
operatives which is our focus is the Nigeria co-operative societies Act4, which makes provision inter-alia for the 
registration of a Co-operative Society 5  as either primary, industrial or secondary, 6  after compliance with 
prescribed requirements for registration.  The registration of a co-operative society renders it a body corporate by 
the name under which it is registered with perpetual succession and a common seal.7  This is often referred to as 
the corporate veil which makes a registered association an artificial person through the corporate personality 
principle given judicial imprimatur by the pivotal House of Lords case of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd.8    
 This article appraises this principle and its relevance to co-operative societies in Nigeria by analysing 
case law on the theory together with relevant statutory provisions as well as the intervention by equity enabling 
judges to look to the substance rather than the form and therefore to be ready to lift the corporate veil to meet the 
justice of a case when appropriate. 
        
1.2 Theory of Corporate Personality  
The most important legal feature of a body corporate is its dual nature as both an association of its 
members and a person separate from its members.9 This is often called, the artificial entity theory of corporate 
personality, which employs the ‘fiction’ theory to ascribe legal personality to an amorphous or incorporeal entity 
known as a company.10 That separate person, though artificial (that is, produced by human artifice rather than 
occurring, naturally), is treated by law as being, as far as possible, a person with the same capacity to engage in 
legal relationships as a human person. As confirmed by Karibi- Whyte, J. S. C. inter alia, “… legal personality 
recognised at law can only be given by the state through it laws by way of statute or other recognised law.”11 In 
Olaniyan & Ors. v University of Lagos,12 Oputa, J.S.C declared that, where a corporation is given or has 
acquired its powers at common  law or by custom or charter, then, it is “a  person at common law and may do 
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 Statement on the Co-operative Identify by the International Co-operative Alliance (1995)  
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 Yebisi, E.T. An Appraisal of the Legal and Regulatory framework of Co-operative Societies in Nigeria, Ph.D Thesis 
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anything which an ordinary person can do”.  The landmark case on the fundamental importance of separate 
personality is Salomon v A. Salomon and Co. Ltd.1  Mr. Salomon had conducted his boot making business as a 
sole trader, and he sold it, to a company incorporated for the purpose called, A Salomon and Co. Ltd. whose only 
members were himself, his wife, a daughter and four sons. These seven individuals were the subscribers of the 
company’s memorandum and took one £1 share each. The business was sold to the company for over £39,000. 
Part of the purchase price was used by Mr. Salomon to subscribe for a further £20,000 shares in the company, 
but £10,000 of the purchase price was not paid by the company, which instead issued Mr. Salomon with a series 
of debentures for £10,000 and gave him a floating charge on its assets as security for the debt. Unfortunately, the 
company’s business failed and the company went into liquidation.  
In an action brought by a debenture-holder on behalf of himself and all the other debenture-holders, the 
court of first instance, presided over by Vaughan Williams J. agreed with the liquidator that, the company was 
formed by Mr. Salomon and the debentures were issued in order that, he might carry  on the business and take all 
the profits without risk to himself , that the company was the mere  nominee and agent of Mr. Salomon; and that, 
the company or the liquidator thereof  was entitled to be indemnified by Mr. Salomon against all the debts owing 
by  the company to creditors other  than Mr. Salomon.2 The judgment of Vaughan Williams J. was affirmed by 
the Court of Appeal, which was of the opinion that, the issue of debentures to Mr. Salomon was a mere scheme 
to enable him to carry on business in the name of the company with limited liability, contrary to the intent and 
meaning of the Companies Act, 1862 and further to enable him to obtain a preference over other creditors of the 
company, by procuring a first charge on the assets of the company by means of such debentures and because of 
Mr. Salomon’s fraud, a constructive trust should be imposed under which the company should be deemed to 
have operated the business as trustee for Mr. Salomon, who should therefore, indemnify the company for the 
debts incurred in carrying out the trust. Thus, the Court of Appeal, dissented from the view taken by Vaughan 
William J. that the company was to be regarded as agent of Mr. Salomon, by considering the relations between 
them to be that of trustee and cestui que trust; but this difference of view of course, did not affect the conclusion 
that the right to the indemnity claimed had been established.3 On further appeal to the House of Lords, the apex 
court rejected the approach of the court of first instance, when Lord Herschell said: 
 In a popular sense, a company may in every case be said to carry on business for and  
on behalf of its shareholders; but this certainly does not in point of law constitute  the 
relations of principal and agent between them or render the shareholders liable to 
indemnity the company against the debts which it incurs.4 
 
The stance of the Court of Appeal was rejected by the House of Lords which held that, there was 
nothing at all in the Companies Act to show that, what Mr. Salomon had done was prohibited. Indeed, Lord 
Macnaghten pointed out that, in an earlier case,5 Gifford, L. J.  had said that, it was, the policy of the Companies 
Act to enable business people to incorporate their businesses and so avoid incurring further personal liability. 
Lord Macnaghten said:  
When the memorandum is duly signed and registered… the subscribers are a body 
corporate capable forthwith to use the words of the enactment, ‘of exercising all the 
functions of an incorporated company’. Those are strong words. The company attains 
maturity on its birth. There is no period of minority – no interval of incapacity. I cannot 
understand how a body corporate thus made ‘capable by statute can lose its individuality by 
issuing the bulk of its capital to one person, whether he be a subscriber to the memorandum 
or not. The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum; and though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the 
same as it was before, and the same persons are managers and the same hands receive the 
profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are 
the subscribers as members liable in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the 
manner provided by the Act. That is I think, the declared intention of the enactment.6  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
  [1897] AC 22 
2
 Subnom Broderip v Salomon  [1895] 2Ch. 323 
3
 Ibid at p.333 
4
 Salomon v Salomon, supra at p.43 
5
 Re Baglan Hall Colliery Co. (1870) LR 5Ch. App. 346 at 356 
6
 Salomon v Salomon supra at p. 51. For the background to Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd which is probably the most 
famous case in Company Law, see G. R. Rubin “ Aron Salomon and his circle” in Essays for Clive Schmitthoff, ed. John 
Adams, Abingdon: Professional Books, 1983 pp 99 - 120  
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1.3 The Corporate Veil and Co-operative Societies    
A co-operative society possesses most of the attributes of a company.1 Under the co-operative societies 
legislation in Nigeria, it is not only a body co-operate on registration, but also enjoys perpetual succession and 
has a common seal.2It can enter into contract, hold movable and immovable property, invest funds and dispose 
of the surplus and institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and can do all things necessary for the 
purpose of its constitution.3 Like a company, a co-operative society may be registered with or without limited 
liability4 and can hold and dispose of its property in the same way as a company can do.5 In particular, a society 
shares most of the characteristics of a company, with regard to allocation of shares, right of members to dividend 
and the appointment of a liquidator on dissolution. The administrative structure of a co-operative society is also 
akin to that of a company in many respects and so are many features of the two. Both a company and a co-
operative society are managed by their members’ general meeting and an elected body of executives called 
respectively “board of directors”6 and “governing committee.”7 
 
The advantages of registration are better appreciated when discussed under the following sub-heads: 
 
1.3.1 Limited liability 
A society may be registered with or without liability. The obsession for limited liability stems from the 
fact that, the liability of the society is different from that of the members and as such, members as individuals 
cannot be compelled to settle the liabilities. Conversely, the debts of the members are not the debts of the 
society.8 Where the society is limited by shares, each member is liable to contribute when called upon to do so, 
the full nominal value of the shares held by him, in so far as this has not already been paid by him or any prior 
holder of those shares. If the society is an unlimited one, their liability to contribute will be unlimited. In 
contrast, an unregistered society not being a legal person, cannot be liable and obligations entered into on its 
behalf, can bind only the actual officials who purport to act on its behalf, or the individual members, if the 
officials have actual or apparent authority to bind them.9 In either event, the persons bound will be liable to the 
full extent of their property, unless they expressly or impliedly restrict their responsibility to the extent of the 
funds of the society, as the officials may well do.10 
 
1.3.2 The right to property 
 One obvious advantage of corporate personality is that, it enables the property of the society to be more 
clearly distinguished from that of its members. On registration, the society’s property belongs to the society and 
members have no direct proprietary rights to it, but merely to their shares in the undertaking. As put poignantly 
by Evershed L. J. “Shareholders are not in the eye of the law, part owners of the undertaking. The undertaking is 
something different from the totality of the shareholding”.11 In an unincorporated society, the property of the 
association is the joint property of the members.12  
 
1.3.3 Perpetual succession  
Another obvious advantage of an artificial person is that it is not susceptible to the vicissitudes of the flesh.13 
Once a society has been incorporated, it has acquired the attribute of having a perpetual succession. In other 
words, the society remains in existence until it is wound up in accordance with the provisions of the law.14 It 
cannot become incapacitated by illness, mental or physical and it has no or need not have an allotted span of life. 
This is not to say that, the death or incapacitation of its human members may not cause the society considerable 
embarrassment; obviously it will if all the committee members die or are jailed or if there are too few surviving 
members to hold a valid meeting. Otherwise, the death of a member leaves the society unmoved. Members may 
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 Eniola, A. (2005) Corporation Law, Ogbomoso; Emiola Publishers Ltd p.78 
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come and go, but the society can go on forever.1 However, the disadvantage in the case of an unincorporated 
society can be minimized by the use of a trust. If the property of the association is vested in a small body of 
trustees, the death, disability or retirement of an individual member, other than one of the trustees need not cause 
much trouble. But of course, the trustees, if natural persons, will themselves need replacing at fairly frequent 
intervals and the need for constant appointment of new trustees is a nuisance if nothing worse.  
 
1.3.4 Ability to sue and be sued 
 A registered society is incapable of suing and being sued in its registered name.2 As a legal person 
imbued with the power of a natural person; it can institute an action to enforce its legal rights or be sued in its 
name for breach of its legal duties, without the necessity of joining any of the committee members or ordinary 
members of the society as parties. 
 
 
1.3.5 Taxation  
Registered societies are exempted from certain duties, chargeable under the Stamp Duties Act and the 
payment of tax under the Companies Income Tax Act.3  
 
1.4 Analysis of the Salomon Principle in Relation to Co-operative Societies 
 The Salomon case was a struggle between form and substance; whether to interpret the law literally or 
whether to consider more its presumed spirit and intention.4 Was a genuine association of seven proprietors 
really necessary to form a company, or would six nominees holding shares for the seventh suffice? Could a paper 
company really transact with the beneficial owner of all its shares? The House of Lords accepted that, if the form 
of the company was within the letter of the law, they would not look behind it to the substance.5 Flowing from 
this decision, the most important characteristic of a registered society is that, it is both an association of its 
members and a person separated from its members. As explained earlier, this separate personality is a 
consequence of the fact that by section 6(1)(a), a registered society is defined to be a body corporate.6 A 
registered society acquires its separate personality on incorporation by registration under the Co-operative 
Societies Act and all that is necessary to achieve this, is to comply with the formal requirements of the Act.7 The 
motives of the persons who incorporate the society are irrelevant,8 so that in relation to government sponsored 
co-operatives, societies may be formed purposely to access for example, a poverty alleviation fund, without any 
genuine intentions at having an enduring society. The Salomon case showed that incorporation, separate 
personality and limited liability are available to all, for any legal purpose, but it has been discovered that 
corporations can be used as vehicles for an enormous variety of transactions and schemes.9 The numerous 
practical advantages of the existence of separate personalities have been discussed earlier, but the rigidity to 
which the doctrine has been subjected by the courts has elicited a measure of opposition to it.10 In a thought 
provoking article, Kahn-Freund described the Salomon decision as a calamitous decision,11 because the courts 
failed to give protection to business creditors and incorporation has often been a means of evading liabilities and 
of concealing the real interests behind businesses.12 Another writer refers to the jurisprudential ineptitude of the 
House of Lords in rejecting the clear intention of the legislature in favour of the application of the so-called 
literal rule of interpretation. Yet another said, the decision has done much to undermine commercial integrity.13 
Perhaps, the most extreme illustration of the Salomon principle is afforded by Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd14. 
                                                 
1
 During the 1939- 1945 War, all the members of one private company, while in general meeting were killed by a bomb. But 
the company survived; not even a hydrogen bomb could have destroyed it; Gower.  op. cit., p.86. See also the Australian 
case of Re Noel Tedman Holding Pty Ltd. (1967) Qd. R. 561 
2
 Op. cit., section 6 (1) (b) (iii) 
3
 Stamp Duties Act, section 8 LFN 2004 and the Companies Income Tax Act, Cap. C21, LFN, 2004 
4
 Hicks A & S. H. Goo (2008) Cases and Materials on Company Law, 6th Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 96 
5
 Per Lord Halsbury L.C. in Salomon v Salomon & Co. Ltd supra at pp.30-1. 
6
 See also equivalent provisions in the Co-operative Societies Law of the States. e.g Ekiti State,   section 8 
 
7
 Ante, our previous discussion on the fiction theory. 
8
 Mayson, French & Ryan, op.cit., p.114. 
9
 Op. cit., p.148 
10
 Hicks, A. (1997) “Limiting the rise of limited liability”, In Baldwin, R and P. Cane (eds) Law and Uncertainty, Kluwer, 
1997. Reproduced by Hicks and Goo op. cit., P.102 
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 Kahn-Freund, O. “Some Reflections on Company Law Reform” (1944) 7 MLR 54. 
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Lee for the purpose of carrying on his business of aerial top-dressing, had formed a company of which he 
beneficially owned all the shares and was sole “governing director”. He was also appointed chief pilot. Pursuant 
to the company’s statutory obligations, he caused the company to insure against liability to pay compensation 
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. He was killed in a flying accident. The Court of Appeal of New 
Zealand held that, his widow was not entitled to compensation from the company, since Lee could not be 
regarded as a “worker” within the meaning of the Act. But the Privy Council reversed the decision, holding that 
Lee and his company were distinct legal entities, which had entered into contractual relationships under which he 
became, qua Chief Pilot, a servant of the company. In his capacity of governing director he could, on behalf of 
the company, give himself orders in his other capacity of pilot, and hence the relationships between himself, as 
pilot, and the company was that of servant and master. In effect, the magic of corporate personality enabled him 
to be master and servant at the same time and to get all the advantages of both. Those bewailing the success of 
the principle of corporate personality dislike the results of confining the rights and especially the obligation of a 
company’s legal relationship to the company as a separate person, and they want the rights or obligations to be 
transferred to the members, or perhaps to directors or other persons connected with the company.1 In effect they 
wanted the artificial separate personality of a company to be ignored. 
 
1.5 Lifting the Corporate Veil 
The courts responded to these concerns by treating in certain circumstances the rights or liabilities of a 
company as those of its shareholders or of anyone else by; “piercing the veil” to use the terminology of 
Staughton L. J or by “lifting the corporate veil” or looking behind it.2 In the cases where the veil is lifted, the law 
either goes behind the corporate personality to the individual members or directors, or ignores the separate 
personality of each company in favour of the economic entity constituted by a group of associated companies.3 
One of the earliest cases where the veil was lifted was in Jones v Lipman,4 where Lipman, having entered into a 
contract to sell land to Jones, attempted to defeat Jones’ right to specific performance by forming a company and 
conveying the land to it. Russel J. made an order for specific performance against both Lipman and the company, 
holding that, specific performance cannot be resisted by a vendor who has absolute ownership and control of the 
company in which the land is vested. In this case and many instances where the veil was lifted, there had been no 
clear guidance as to the principles which should guide the court in determining whether or not, to lift the veil of 
incorporation.5 
 Arguments over ‘lifting the veil’ have raged throughout the common law world for the whole of the 20th 
century and it is continuing in the 21st century.6 It would be impossible to reconcile the hundreds of cases 
thought to be relevant to the argument or the dozens of academic opinions. Cases are decided by judges who 
adopt different attitudes to the question and rarely, if ever state what their general theory of corporate personality 
is.7 The different judicial approaches may be illustrated by two quotations from the Presidents (as they then 
were) of the appeal courts in England and New Zealand. In Littlewoods Mail Order Store Ltd v Commissioners 
of Inland Revenue,8 Lord Denning M.R said that, the doctrine laid down in Salomon v A. Salomon and Co. Ltd 
has to be watched very carefully. In Re Securitibank Ltd,9 Richmond P. responded; 
for myself, and with all respect, I would rather approach the question the other way 
round, that is to say on the basis that any suggested departure from the doctrine laid 
down in Salomon v A Salomon and Co. Ltd should be watched very carefully. 
              Sometimes, a court on being invited to disregard the separate personality of a company, enumerates 
circumstances in which it says this may be done and then decides that the cases before it does not fall within 
those circumstances.10 Unfortunately, the list of circumstances provided by courts vary considerably (probably 
reflecting differences of view on what constitutes lifting the veil of incorporation or disregarding separate 
personality) and, of course, a court arguing in this way is primarily concerned with circumstances relevant to the 
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 Mayson, French & Ryan, op. cit., p.148 
2
 Atlas Maritime Co. SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No.1) [1991] 4 AII E.R. 769 
3
 Gower, op. cit., 148. 
4
 [1962] 1 All ER 442.   
5
 Gower, op. cit., 171. 
6
 Wedderburn, R. “Corporate Ombudsman” (1960)23 MLR 481; Barnes K. “Lifting the veil of corporate personality between 
holding and subsidiary companies” (1988) VILR 76; Akomolede I. op cit., 43 
7
 Mayson, French & Ryan, op. cit., p.150 
8
 [1969]1WLR 124 at 1254 
9
 [1978] 2 NZLR 136 at 159. 
10
 See e.g Pioneer Laundry and Dry Cleaner Ltd v Minister of National Revenue [1940] AC 127; Re Kinookimaw Beach 
Association (1979) 102 DLR (3d) 333; Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yehnah Pty Ltd [1986] 5 WWR 159; Sharrment 
Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1988) 82 ALR 530.  
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case before it and not producing a general theory.  In Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional council,1 Lord Keith 
posited that, it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist, indicating that it 
is a mere façade concealing the true facts. Although, this dictum is of undeniable high authority, his, lordship did 
not explain what he meant by piercing the corporate veil, or consider many previous cases, so the scope of the 
principle enunciated by his Lordship is not clear. In Adams v Cape Industries Plc,2 the English Court of Appeal 
said: 
From the authorities cited to us we are left with rather sparse guidance as to the 
principles which should guide the court in determining whether or not the arrangements 
of a corporate group involve a façade within the meaning of that word as used by the 
House of Lords in Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional council. We will not attempt a 
comprehensive definition of those principles. 
 
 The practical problem for a lawyer is to discover whether, what he or she wants the court to do would 
be regarded by the court as inconsistent with the principle of separate personality and so an attempt to disregard 
the corporate veil. If the court will regard it as disregarding the veil, the lawyer must then discover the conditions 
on which the court will disregard the veil and try to establish that his or her case satisfies those conditions. The 
wider the courts view of the effect of separate personality and of the occurrence of disregarding the veil, the 
more likely it is to accept that disregarding the veil is normal practice. A court taking a narrow view will think 
that, disregarding the veil hardly ever occurs and so is hardly ever justified of justice. The conundrum is still not 
resolved under the rubric “interest”. In both Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue3 and Wallersteiner v Moir,4 Lord Denning M.R thought that disregarding the veil was required to deal 
with those cases, however, it is not exactly clear what his lordship’s veil disregarding was actually going to do, 
and in both cases the other members of the Court of Appeal said that, veil disregarding was not required. It is a 
mark of the change in judicial attitudes in England that in 1989, in Adams v Cape Industries Plc, the court of 
Appeal, said that Lord Denning’s dicta in Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue and Wallersteiner v Moir could provide little support for a plaintiff’s claim to have the veil 
disregarded.5 In Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd,6 
Lord Denning, MR was again alone among the members of the Court of Appeal in believing that, the case before 
them could be solved by treating money owed to one company as being owed to its parent company, which 
would be regarded by anyone as ignoring corporate personality. Lord Denning’s view in the cases considered, 
that separate personality of a company could be ignored if it was a ‘puppet’ of another person, where puppet 
seems to mean no more than that, the company is under the other person’s control or its kindred epithets like 
controllers’ clone7 or that the controller is the company’s alter ego8 is now a dead letter, because the Court of 
Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries,9 rejected the view of Lord Denning that, a company’s separate personality 
should be ignored simply because it is controlled by another person.10 
In Adeyemi v Lan and Baker Nigeria Ltd,11 Aderemi, J. C. A., explained as follows: 
“The consequence of recognising the separate personality of a company is to draw a veil of 
incorporation over the company and that one is generally not entitled to go behind or lift the 
veil. Since a limited liability company exists in the eye of the law it can only operate by means 
of human beings. But it is now settled in law that the directors or the managers are those whose 
decisions can be attributed to the legal fiction… However, there is nothing sacrosanct about 
the veil of incorporation… The decision in Salomon v Salomon must not blind one to the 
essential facts of dependency and neither must it compel a court to engage in an exercise of 
finding of fact which is contrary to the true intentions or positions voluntarily created by the 
parties as distinct from an artificial or fictitious one. Thus, if it is discovered from the material 
before the court, that a company is the creature of a biological person, be he a managing 
director, and it is a device or sham, masked by the eye of equity, the court must be ready and 
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 (1978) SC (HL) 90 at 96. 
2
 [1990] Ch 433 at 543 
3
 Supra 
4
 [1974]1 WLR 991 
5
 Mayson, French & Ryan, op. cit., p.150-157 
6
 [1982] QB 84 
7
 R v MerBan Capital Corporation Ltd. [1985] 1CTCI at p.4 
8
 Yukong Line Ltd v Rendsburg Investments Corporation (No.2) [1998] 1WLR 294 at 299 
9
 Supra 
10
 WD Latine Co. v Dison Investment Ltd (1992) 12 OR (3rd) 415. 
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 [2000] 7 NWLR (pt.663) 33 at 51 
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willing to open the veil of incorporation to see the character behind it, if justice must be seen to 
be done… 
 
 Here again we are treated with the same jejune arguments regarding the courts inherent jurisdiction to 
lift the corporate veil in the interest of justice, without any inkling regarding the circumstances in which this 
power is to be exercised. The judicial conundrum is best summarized by the court in Creasy v Breachwood 
Motor Ltd as follows: 
The power of the court to lift the corporate veil exists… The authorities provide little 
guidance as to the circumstances in which this power is to be exercised.1 
What can be gleaned from the foregoing is that, the rigid concept of separate corporate personality is 
still alive and well, even in relation to co-operative societies law. It is however pertinent to mention that, some 
statutes mention specific instances when the veil of incorporation will be lifted.2   
 
1.6 Ray of light at the end of the tunnel  
          However, the House of Lords seems to have put to bed, the incoherence regarding applicable principles or 
defined limitations of the jurisdiction to lift the veil, when it held recently that the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil should only be invoked, where a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject 
to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by 
interposing a company under his control. In such circumstance, the court may pierce the corporate veil, but only 
for the purpose of depriving the company or its controllers of the advantage which would otherwise have accrued 
by the company’s separate legal personality.3  
1.5 Conclusion  
 The separate corporate personality concept as applied to corporations does not exempt registered co-
operative societies in spite of the numerous judicial and academic assaults, which were highlighted in the article.  
The advantages of the corporate veil are well documented in the work and therefore the power of the courts to 
pierce the veil must not be exercised capriciously.  The recent case of Prest v Pretrodel Resources gives comfort 
in providing a legal elixir regarding when appropriate to lift the corporate veil and the Nigerian courts should not 
tarry in adopting the dictum in relation to co-operatives in appropriate circumstances.        
 
                                                 
1
 [1993] BCLC 480 at 491 
2
 For example: Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap C20 LFN 2004, sections 93,246(3), 290, 333-338, 316, 506(1) and 
548(4); Companies Income Tax Act, LFN 2004, section 85; Nigerian Co-operative Societies Act 2004, sections 34(4), 46 and 
53(2); Co-operative Societies Regulations, Cap 35 (Oyo State) section 29 
3
 Per Lord Sumption in Prest v Pretrodel Resources [2013] UKSC 34; Businessday: www.businessdayonline.com Thursday 18 
July, 2013 
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